| Why Regionalism May Increase the Demand for Trade Protection |
Sanoussi Bilal |
| European Institute of Public Administration |
| Copyright ©1998 Journal of Economic Integration |
| ABSTRACT |
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This paper examines the influence of regional integration on the demand for trade protection. Previous studies have suggested the a customs union reduces the pressures for trade restrictions, as national interest groups have less weight to influence a central trade authority than their own government. On the con trary, this paper argues that protectionist preferences may not be diluted at the regional level. The reasons for this lie in the ability of protection interests to o rganize themselves at the regional level and the advantage they have over anti-protectionist forces in doing so (principally due to their superiority in con trolling the potential free rider problem). In consequence, specific groups seek ing external protection are likely to experience a relative (if not absolute) rein forcement of their preferences in a trade bloc. (JEL Classification: D72, F13) |
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