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Journal of Economic Integration 2004 June;19(2) :271-288.
Two Alternative Sequences of WTO Negotiations: Implications for Welfare

Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis 

United Nations University - World Institute , for Development Economics Research
Copyright ©2004 Journal of Economic Integration

We develop a partial equilibrium, sequential model of trade negotiation between

an OECD country and two developing countries. First, we show that there are

substantive qualitative and quantitative differences in the state of market access

and domestic support that emerge under possible alternative sequences in which

the negotiating game can be played. We then explore the welfare implications of such alternative sequences on the various stakeholders within the OECD. The

welfare outcomes point to various lobbying activities which can influence the

trade negotiator and contribute to the confusion and disagreement on who should commit to its policies first.

JEL Classifications: C72, F12, F13

Keywords: WTO | Sequential | Welfare | Lobbying | Tariffs
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